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Introduction  
Within the international community the most important contemporary issue related to the Korean 
peninsula undoubtedly is North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and its potential 
consequences for Asian regional stability and U.S. policy. Although that issue clearly is very 
important to North and South Korea as well, both Koreas also deem its impact on inter-Korean 
reconciliation efforts to be crucially important. The way these two themes may interact warrants 
more attention than is normally paid by non-Koreans. The focus of this analysis shall be on the 
ramifications a North Korean nuclear program may have upon the evolving Korean unification 
process and for the resulting united Korean state. Will it be a non-nuclear state or a nuclear-
armed state?  
Before addressing that evolutionary process, it is worth providing some contextual background for 
those readers who are not familiar with Korean affairs. While it is relatively well known that North 
Korea ’s pursuit of its nuclear weapons option became a major issue in the early post-Cold War 
years,[1] nuclear weaponry has played various roles in shaping the dynamic between the two 
Koreas. Citizens of both Koreas are well aware that their nation’s liberation from Imperial Japan’s 
colonial rule was symbolized by the United States’ dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. Similarly both Koreas had to cope with the possibility that the Korean War might 
escalate to the use of nuclear weapons, which proved to be an inducement to halting the conflict 
via a negotiated armistice. The risks associated with nuclear escalation in that war helped shape 
a limited war strategic paradigm for the remaining decades of the Cold War. Still more important, 
the post-Korean War balance of power on the peninsula was strongly influenced by the U.S.-
Soviet global nuclear balance of power, which incorporated on the U.S. side American use of 
South Korea as a venue for deploying tactical nuclear weapons that also sent a signal to deter 
North Korea. [2]  
Nuclear Awareness 
In short, Koreans in both halves of the divided nation were profoundly aware of the importance of 
nuclear weapons. This was reinforced by the recognition in Seoul and Pyongyang that neither's 
U.S. nor Soviet backers would tolerate the ROK or the DPRK pursuing a nuclear weapons option. 
This was more obvious in South Korea where the United States’ role as the provider of a nuclear 
umbrella for various allies worldwide was used as a rationale for impeding any efforts by those 
allies to develop their own nuclear weaponry. Efforts by the Park Chung-hee government in the 
1970s to pursue a nuclear weapons option were blocked by the United States.[3] The Park 
government was motivated by a combination of a desire for nationalistic self-reliance and 
anxieties in the post-Vietnam War context about the reliability of the U.S. strategic commitment to 
the ROK. As U.S.-ROK security relations adapted to the post-Vietnam War adjustments within the 
Asian theater of the Cold War, South Korea ’s overt aspirations for nuclear weaponry were stifled. 
However, because the PRC had nuclear weapons and many South Koreans assumed Japan—
despite its pacifism and supposed “nuclear allergy”—would eventually acquire a nuclear weapons 
capability in order to create a balance of power with China, it was not unusual for South Koreans 
to harbor hopes that someday Koreans would join their ranks.  
To better appreciate that mind set it is important to grasp a long-standing Korean perception of its 
place within the traditional Sino-Japanese relationship. This is well expressed in an old proverb: 
“In a fight between whales, the back of a shrimp bursts” (gorae ssaum ae saewoodung tuhjinda 
).[4] Koreans felt distinctly shrimp-like amidst late 19th century Sino-Japanese pressures on 
Korea, becoming involuntarily part of the Japanese empire’s geopolitical quest for Asian 
lebensraum at China’s expense up through World War II, and finding itself in the vortex of U.S.-
Soviet Cold War tensions shaped—in part—by each’s relations with Japan and China. Making 
matters worse, both Koreas understood that the “shrimp” nation’s division into two states caught 
up in the Cold War dynamic exacerbated the dilemma by forcing each half of the shrimp to have 
to cope with the power of the whales at the same time as they were attempting to reunify their 
nation state so that they could make it less shrimp-like in the nuclear era.  
Against this background, North Korea’s post-Cold War efforts to take full advantage of no longer 
being under the constraints of the Soviet Union by following the same path the PRC pursued in 
the mid-1960s to develop nuclear weapons struck an ambivalent note in South Korea. Even 
though the ROK had ample reason to welcome the United States’ non-proliferation policies’ focus 
on the threat posed by North Korea’s potential use of nuclear weapons against the South—
turning it into a “sea of fire”—North Korea’s ability to get away with doing what Sout h Korea had 
been unable to do caused some adverse reactions in the South. On the official level this was 
most apparent with regard to South Korean discomfort regarding the style of U.S. non-
proliferation policies that were largely devised for global purposes and then applied to Korea 
without the level of advance consultations South Koreans deemed appropriate. This U.S. 
approach reminded many South Koreans of past client state relationships they assumed the ROK 
had outgrown as a result of maturing ROK-U.S. relations. Because of the profound overtones of a 
sadaejui (flunkeyism) complex embodied in client-state ties, many South Koreans did not 
appreciate being thrust into this position as a result of North Korea being able to do what the 
ROK’s U.S. ally had prevented South Korea from doing. This resistance to U.S. pressures ended 
up having long-term political consequences in South Korea that are very salient in the 
contemporary nuclear and inter-Korean situations.  
South Korean popular culture also was influenced by reactions to what North Korea was 
attempting to do on the nuclear front, U.S. responses to the DPRK, and memories of past U.S. 
involvement in South Korea’s attempts to develop a nuclear option. In 1994, the same year as the 
United States and North Korea came close to war over getting the DPRK to acquiesce to U.S. 
demands, a South Korean novelist—Kim Chin-myung—clearly touched a nerve in Korean society 
via a conspiratorial novel about a U.S. plot to prevent North and South Korea from collaborating 
in pursuing nuclear weapons to cope with Japan’s nuclear agenda. This three volume novel, The 
Rose of Sharon Has Blossomed (Mugunghwa kkot i piussumnida)[5] became a major hit, selling 
over 4.5 million copies. The Mugunghwa (Rose of Sharon) in the title is the Republic of Korea’s 
national flower and can be seen as a symbol of a future reunited Korean nation. The general 
public’s interest in this topic suggests empathy for the suspicions the novel expresses about U.S 
purposes in impeding Korean nuclear ambitions—Northern or Southern.  
Lest one chalk that up to a decade old literary fluke, the same author produced another 
conspiratorial novel in 2003 called The Third Scenario (Jae sam ui sinario)[6] that focuses on 
U.S. efforts to prevent Korean unification, assassinate the leaders of both Koreas, and make use 
of a war in Korea for U.S. purposes. This book has sold over a million copies.[7] Beyond any 
literary merits these novels may possess, they are far more important in the ways their 
phenomenal popularity suggests a willingness on the part of many South Koreans to contemplate 
the merits of the entire Korean nation demonstrating its strategic sovereignty by becoming a 
nuclear power. That would be a formidably well armed “shrimp” indeed. Koreans contemplating 
such an option might well consider adapting a label some Singaporeans use to describe their 
country’s strong defenses, namely a “poison shrimp.”[8] Such attitudes are reflected in early 2004 
polling data that found thirty nine percent of South Koreans considered the United States posed 
the greatest threat to the ROK, compared to thirty three percent who ranked North Korea as the 
greatest threat.[9] Similarly other early 2004 polling showed forty six percent of South Koreans 
saw the United States as the main obstacle to Korean reunification, compared to twenty five 
percent who named the DPRK.[10]  
Inter-Korean Context 
Against that background, inter-Korean efforts to reconcile their differences and seek reunification 
concurrent with a U.S.-led campaign to resolve the problems stemming from North Korea ’s 
nuclear weapons aspirations may complicate that campaign’s prospects. All Americans who are 
concerned about the efficacy of U.S. efforts to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear 
agenda and pursue a more moderate set of foreign and defense policies would be well advised to 
familiarize themselves with past[11] and recent efforts[12] in both Koreas to deal with 
reunification. Similarly, they should become familiar with the recent analyses done in the United 
States about North Korea [13] and about U.S. policy options toward Korean reunification.[14]  
As important as the nuclear issue is to the United States and the other major power players 
involved in the Six-Party Talks process (China, Japan, and Russia), for the two Koreas all of 
those attempts also are part of a larger process aimed at reconciling and unifying their nation. 
Because of that inter-Korean contextual perspective, while it has to appear sympathetic to the 
United States’ hardline “CVID” jargon (“complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement”) aimed at 
pressuring Pyongyang to acquiesce to U.S. demands, Seoul also does its best to get Washington 
to understand its desires for a more moderate approach to inducing North Korea to change its 
policies. Although U.S. officials have suggested that the “CVID” approach is no longer the core of 
U.S. policy toward the North Korean nuclear issue,[15] many South Koreans remain convinced 
that it is. That viewpoint is reinforced by the all too evident gap between the Bush administration’s 
brand of conservatism[16] and the Roh Moo-hyun government’s very liberal policies. The ROK 
under Roh has been frustrated by its inability to get the Bush administration to pay more attention 
to how it thinks the U.S.-ROK strategic partnership should deal with the challenges posed by 
North Korea. In sharp contrast, they have found the PRC to be more cooperative and flexible. 
This rapport is reinforced by the increasing overlap in ROK-PRC socio-economic interests.[17]  
Amidst the U.S. political campaign season the next round in the Six-Party Talks was effectively 
postponed until after the November elections, even though China, which hosts these talks in 
Beijing, wanted them to be held in late September.[18] On balance, this probably will prove to be 
useful because the victor in the U.S. presidential race will then have a four year mandate in the 
future of his administration. Equally important, turning that electoral corner will eliminate the 
ambiguity demonstrated by both South and North Korea about having to deal with the Bush 
administration representing the United States at the talks. Both Seoul and Pyongyang leadership 
harbor hopes that, were Senator Kerry to become President Kerry, the United States would be far 
more amenable to a negotiated resolution of the nuclear issue that would be simultaneously 
closer to the ROK’s position on dealing with the DPRK’s nuclear option[ 19] and more acceptable 
to North Korea. Although the Kerry campaign welcomed indications that South Koreans as well 
as many others around the world are more supportive of his candidacy than of President Bush’s 
reelection,[20] among the last things his campaign would have wanted is any sort of de facto 
endorsement by the Kim Jong-il regime. How much genuine difference there might be between 
these alternative U.S. administrations’ approach to the North Korean nuclear issue, and toward 
the prospects of resolution of that issue becoming part of the Korean reunification process, is very 
debatable. Regardless of the outcome in the United States, however, in the wake of those 
elections a U.S. administration will have to address these Korean issues and both Koreas will 
have to deal with U.S. policy toward them.  
September Surprise 
This entire situation was shaken by surprising revelations in early September that South Korean 
scientists were working on nuclear power experiments in the year 2000.[21] This caused Seoul to 
try to explain the experiments as both minor and unrelated to nuclear weapons.[22] As South 
Korea’s past nuclear experiments drew increasing attention, ROK officials cautiously 
acknowledged the experiments could have more theoretical significance than originally ascribed 
to them.[23] In turn, all this activity drew more critical attention[24] and caused the IAEA to 
refocus its attention on South Korea.[25] Compounding the controversy of the Korean nuclear 
situation were the subsequent reports of a North Korean nuclear weapons test near the DPRK’s 
border with China that were swiftly denied by North Korea and discredited by most international 
observers, but—when seen in the context of South Korea’s nuclear experimentation—they added 
to the sense of ambiguity surrounding Korean nuclear issues.[26]  
All of this attention to nuclear issues in both Koreas tended to reinforce the conventional wisdom 
behind U.S. policy and the policy of the United States’ main Asian ally, Japan, toward Korea 
which was succinctly expressed by former Secretary of State James Baker in the conclusion of a 
recent opinion column: “No country, including China and Russia, wants to see a nuclear weapons 
capability on the Korean Peninsula.”[27] That assessment from a conservative vantage point was 
offered in support of the current President Bush’s efforts to create support for the United States’ 
attempt to block nuclear proliferation in Korea. A similar viewpoint was expressed in considerable 
detail by one of the United States’ leading progressive analysts of Korean affairs, Selig Harrison, 
whose overall perspective is quite different from the current Bush administration.[28] Whether the 
United States is led by a second term of the Bush administration or by a Kerry administration, it is 
likely that these parameters will shape U.S. policy toward Korea in pursuit of more or less the 
same goal.  
As balanced and sound as that goal is, and as much as the United States has every right to 
expect its South Korean ally to support that objective, there is reason to second guess the 
prospects for success. U.S. desires for a non-nuclear Korea are not new. Koreans in both Koreas 
are well aware that the United States prevented the ROK under Park Chung-hee from becoming 
a nuclear power, clearly wants to halt North Korea’s current nuclear agenda, and is more than 
annoyed by the persistence of some South Koreans to explore the ROK’s nuclear potentials. In 
this context it is legitimate to ask whether U.S. pursuit of a non-nuclear Korea will succeed in 
preventing Koreans in a reuniting Korea from having the same nuclear option that China 
successfully pursued and Japan must contemplate as it confronts both China’s rising power and 
the possibility of a strong reunited Korean nation state in between Japan and China. In short, may 
the Mugunghwa/Rose of Sharon of literary notoriety yet blossom? It could under certain 
circumstances.  
Unification By War 
Were Korea to unify as a result of a war that would entail U.S. intervention in order to rescue the 
ROK from the DPRK by eliminating its nuclear capabilities, thereby creating circumstances likely 
to lead to Chinese involvement as well, the resulting united Korean state would be unable to 
pursue many options—nuclear included—that the foreign interventionists are prepared to block. 
Moreover, a united Korea that would emerge from war would likely be so damaged by the war 
that it could not pursue a nuclear option. Similarly, albeit far less dangerous to all concerned, 
were a united Korea to emerge as a result of any North Korean collapse scenario, the burdens 
imposed on South Koreans as they pick up the pieces and try to assemble a viable Korean nation 
state would be so formidable that Seoul’s abject dependence on foreign assistance would compel 
such a united Korea to acquiesce to all the foreign benefactors’ desires that Korea not pursue a 
nuclear option.  
The costs and risks associated with the renewed war and catastrophic collapse scenarios make it 
clear why they should be avoided if possible for the sake of Korea ’s future. Even if the United 
States and other countries might perceive thes e scenarios in a somewhat favorable light because 
they would almost certainly preclude a nuclear option for the resulting united Korea, the inherent 
costs and risks are too large. Similarly, the potential for preemptive North Korean regime change 
to create costly long-term burdens for the resulting united Korea—that would foreclose its nuclear 
option—on balance make this scenario very undesirable for Korea.[29] Were any country or 
countries to pursue that sort of scenario via economic, political, or military means, it/they would 
end up paying the price in both financial terms and in future relations with Korea.  
A Better Option 
Clearly there is a better option. The United States—and any of the other countries that want to 
avoid a nuclear Korea—should develop policies designed to help both Koreas’ mutual 
engagement policies intended to reconcile their differences and create the means to develop a 
unified Korea. For the United States and its South Korean ally this would entail greater 
appreciation by Washington of President Roh Moo-hyun’s version of President Kim Dae-jung’s 
“sunshine policy” now called the “policy of peace and prosperity”[30] and the ways President Roh 
uses the policy to expand South Korea’s engagement with North Korea.[31] Such support by the 
United States—preferably in conjunction with China, Japan, and Russia—will minimize the 
chance that the Mugunghwa/Rose of Sharon nuclear option will ever be contemplated seriously 
by Koreans because of their collective sense of gratitude and obligation toward the external 
powers that will have acted as facilitators and catalysts for peaceful Korean reconciliation and 
unification.  
If the United States and the other major powers were to abstain from such engagement in 
assisting the two Koreas to become one, especially if the United States were to be perceived in 
both Koreas as once again pretending to be supportive of a Korean reunification agenda while 
expecting it will fail (as others have in the past) that Koreans can see as analogous to the “free 
vote” congressional metaphor,[32] it could well set the stage for inter-Korean bilateral 
negotiations—without any external mediation or assistance—which might produce a united Korea 
with reasons to be well disposed toward a nuclear option. The foundation of those reasons would 
be Korean nationalism that is already motivating both Koreas’ fervor for reuniting and would 
receive a tremendous boost were the two Koreas to resolve their differences solely on their own. 
A united Korean nation state spawned by such a process is virtually certain to be very conscious 
of its independence and national pride. While it is conceivable that such a Korean state could 
pursue a neutralist foreign policy as some have advocated,[33] a nationalistic united Korea is far 
more likely to be pragmatic in its international realism, perhaps aligning Korea with Kenneth 
Waltz’s contention that greater possession of nuclear weapons can enhance geopolitical 
stability.[34] This would enable Korea to strive to be on a par with its Chinese and Japanese 
neighbors. Since the PRC is a major nuclear power and Japan has the technological know-how to 
become a nuclear power very rapidly—making Japan a de facto “virtual” nuclear power[35]—it is 
all too easy to visualize a nationalistic united Korea that owed no obligation to any external power 
for its creation contemplating a nuclear option in order to generate a stabilized regional balance of 
power. Such a Korea might well perceive the notions embodied in the Mugunghwa/Rose of 
Sharon literary metaphor as the essence of realism capable of making Korea a truly formidable 
“poison shrimp.” Clearly, however, none of this would be in U.S. national interests regarding its 
nuclear non-proliferation policies.  
On balance the most prudent approach the United States can take toward the Korean nuclear 
issue is to avoid the war-based, collapse-based, regime change-based, and autonomous 
negotiations-based scenarios for resolving inter-Korean tensions. Instead, the United States—
preferably in conjunction with regional partners—should do its utmost to be supportive of the 
inter-Korean engagement processes that can reconcile Korean differences and reunify the 
Korean nation in a state that will have moral and geopolitical obligations toward its external 
benefactors and the international system they play major roles in shaping. That approach will 
simultaneously resolve the Korean nuclear issues and the longstanding issues surrounding a 
divided Korea that should have been resolved decades ago.  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month, email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe". There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
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